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On How to Refer to Unobservable Entities

Gregory P. Taylor

In order for us to associate a word with an object it might seem
that we would need to have direct experience with both. Given the
present technology, however, there are some objects with which we can
have no direct experience, namely the unobservable entities postulated
by scientific theories. The problem taken up here is how to refer to
those entities. There are two prominent attempts to explain reference in
scientific theories – the first is Ramsey and Carnap’s proposal that we
exchange theoretical terms for variables and existential quantification.
The second is Kripke and Evan’s causal theory of names and rigid
designation. I will argue that the most plausible theory of reference to
unobservables lies in between these two theories; terms that purport to
refer to unobservable entities, when occurring within a theory, need to
be thought of as bound variables. But when those same terms occur in
sentences outside of the theory, as when spoken, for example, they
occur as genuine referring expressions, which have their reference
determined by a theory.
I. Theories
I will assume, for now, that it is legitimate to talk about ideal
reconstructions of theories in which a theory is a set of assertoric
sentences, to be distinguished from journal articles, textbooks, and the
research program that revolves around the theory. A theory also needs
to be distinguished from a scientist’s expression of that theory. In what
follows, “theory” should be taken to refer to that which both scientists
and philosophers of science assume when they speak of the
implications of a theory, of reducing one theory to another, or of a
theory explaining a phenomenon. (As will become clear later, theories
as such must exist in order for us to be able to refer to unobservable
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entities.) Within the sentences that make up a theory, Carnap
distinguishes between theoretical and observational sentences.
Whereas observational sentences contain only terms that refer to
objects of immediate experience, theoretical sentences contain
reference to unobservable entities. The two are connected by
correspondence rules that relate unobservable entities to observable
ones. An example of such a rule would be: “The temperature of a gas is
proportional to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules.” Temperature
is a property with which we are all familiar and which scientists can
directly measure, whereas the only empirical evidence we can have for
the mean kinetic energy of a set of molecules is through
correspondence rules like this one. A theory consists of the theoretical
and observational sentences plus the correspondence rules.1
II. Ramsey-Carnap Theory of Theoretical Terms
Imagine that we have a theory with the theoretical terms
“electron,” “proton,” “atom,” “mass,” and “velocity” (among others
left out for simplicity). Using Carnap’s construal of a theory, we will
have a series of theoretical sentences containing these terms, and
correspondence sentences which contain these terms along with the
observational terms O1, O2, O3…On. The theory consists of a set of
sentences, and can be represented in its entirety in the following
manner:
(T)…electron…proton…atom…mass…velocity…O1…O2…O3…
On …
The “…” represent the connections between all of these terms (the
other words), and “electron”…“O3” represent all occurrences of those
terms in the theory. We should actually imagine (T) as being the theory
written out in full – this device has the sole purpose of making those
terms stand out.
Ramsey realized that by turning all of the theoretical terms into
variables and quantifying over the whole theory we get a new set of
sentences that would have exactly the same predictive and explanatory
power as (T).2 Substituting “c1” for every occurrence of “electron,” “c2”

1 See Carnap, Rudolf An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science ed. Martin Gardner (New York: Basic
Books 1966) 225-233
2 See Ramsey, Frank “Theories” in The Foundations of Mathematics ed. R.B. Braithwaite (London:
Routledge 1931), 221-236. The formulation that follows is parasitic on Carnap’s formulation in
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 249-251
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for “proton,” “c3” for “atom,” “R1” for “mass,” “R2” for “velocity,”
and then quantifying over the whole theory, we get:
(R) c1 c2 c3 R1 R2(…c1 … c2… c3 … R1 … R2 … O1 … O2 …
O3…).
This is called the ramsey-sentence for a theory. The variables, like the
names in (T), are to be taken as classes of all particular occurrences of
those variables in the theory, and what (R) does is replace each
occurrence of a sentence like “mass(electron) = 10” in the theory with
“there is a c1 and an R1 such that R1(c1) = 10,” while maintaining the
same structure and non-theoretical terms of the theory. Where (T)
would say “electrons have properties x, y, and z,” (R) says “there is a
thing, and that thing has properties x, y, and z.” The ramsey-sentence
eliminates all occurrences of theoretical names, while maintaining the
same assertoric force of the theory.
Quine would later use a similar device, in attempt to demonstrate
the superfluity of singular terms altogether: instead of the sentences
“Socrates is wise” we could say “there is a thing which is both Socrates
and wise,” thus converting Socrates from a name to a predicate, and
eliminating reference.3 Like Quine, Ramsey was interested in eliminating
the problem of reference, and he proposed the ramsey-sentence as a
means of avoiding using names.
Unlike Ramsey, though, Carnap was not content to leave things as
they stand with (R); he wanted to define the reference of theoretical
terms, not eliminate them. To accomplish this he introduced an analyticpostulate, which combines the standard expression of a theory, (T), and
the ramsey-sentence, (R), and forms a conditional:
(A) c1 c2 c3 R1 R2(…c1 … c2… c3 … R1 … R2 … O1 … O2 …
O3…)
(…electron…proton…atom…mass…velocity…O1…O2…O3)4
This states that if (R) is true, then (T) is true too. What could make (R)
true is a series of objects that satisfy (R). (The sentence “there is an x
such that x is green” is satisfied by the objects frog and leaf, but not by
the objects White House or sun.) If there is a series of objects that satisfy
(R), then the corresponding theory that uses the theoretical terms
“electron,” “proton” etc… is also true.

3
4

Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 179-187
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 271
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Carnap’s analytic-postulate fixes the reference for the said
theoretical terms in the following manner: for (T) to be true the terms
in it would have to refer (“electrons are x” can’t be true unless there are
electrons). If (R) is satisfied (and therefore true), (A) gives a stipulative
definition of the theoretical terms, by telling us to replace each
occurrence of “c1” with “electron,” “c2” with “proton,” and so forth.
(A), then, fixes the reference of the theoretical terms. But since (A)
stipulates the definition for these terms, “before [(A)] is laid down, these
terms have no interpretation, not even a partial one. The only
interpretation they receive in this form of the theory is the partial
interpretation they obtain through this A-postulate.”5 This entails that if
(R) is false (not satisfied) then no interpretation is given of the terms,
because we learn nothing of the truth or falsity of (T).
(A) is an analytic postulate and all it tells us is that if there is a series
of objects that satisfy the theory, then the terms in the theory refer to
those objects. For the empirical content of the theory Carnap suggest
that we use (R), which he calls the synthetic postulate. The whole
picture, then, is this: (R) is the portion of the theory with empirical
content – when we test the theory we are testing (R). What (A) tells us
is that if (R) is true then the theoretical terms in (T) denote the objects
that satisfy (R). (A) makes no empirical claims, because it is a stipulative
definition.
Carnap’s entire project here is an attempt to reformulate the
analytic/synthetic distinction. Quine famously argued that when we test
(T) we test all of (T), and therefore there is no distinguishing between
those sentences which can be held true come what may (analytic) and
those which can’t (synthetic).6 Carnap has found a holistic means of
defining the terms of the theory so as to get around Quine’s arguments
(the terms are not defined individually, but the meaning of every term
in the theory is stipulated at the same time, when (A) is laid down). (T)
is logically equivalent to (A) and (R), but (A) has no empirical import
(because it is stipulative).7 And since (A) and (R) are logically
independent of each-other, when we test the theory we test (R). Thus
when we get a recalcitrant experience the adjustments will have to take
place in (R); adjusting (A) could have no predictive consequences.
Ibid, 271
Quine, W.V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard
U. Press 1953) 20-46
7 Quine himself admits in “Two Dogmas” that there is a clear distinction between the analytic and
the synthetic in the case of stipulation, and this is precisely the “loophole” that Carnap takes
advantage of; see ibid, 26
5
6
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The new formulation of analyticity produces a new problem,
though. Carnap’s method can only interpret the terms if the theory is
satisfied. All old theories become nonsense under this view, and as
Philip Percival points out, “it is absurd… to suppose that ‘electron’
lacks denotation if current theory has the mass of an electron wrong at
the second decimal place.”8 Perhaps we might try changing “true” to
“mostly true.” This doesn’t get us anywhere, though. Even if we assume
that our present theories are mostly true, and that most of the terms
refer, we have absolutely no way of knowing which. For any term in the
theory, it might be one of the few that don’t refer. Also, what kind of a
truth-value is mostly true? If the antecedent of a conditional is mostly
true, does that make the consequent true or mostly true? Perhaps we
could spell it out as saying that most of the sentences are true, but then,
again, how are we to know which? The point here is not against
scientific realism – our theories might be “mostly true.” But whether or
not that is the case, “mostly” truth won’t allow an analytic postulate like
(A) to fix the reference of theoretical terms, because mostly truth has
no set implications for a conditional.
Ramsey argued that we could get along fine without theoretical
terms; why did Carnap feel compelled to define them? He says
something very peculiar about Ramsey’s point:
Ramsey certainly didn’t mean… that physicists should abandon theoretical terms in their
speech and writing. To do so would require enormously complicated statements…How can
the sentence ‘Mass (17) = 5’ [where “17” is the name of a particular object] be translated into
Ramsey’s language? ‘R2 (17) = 5’ obviously will not do; it is not even a sentence.9

Well, “R2 (17) = 5” is not our only option; what about “ R2(R2 (17) =
5)”? Since ‘Mass (17) = 5’ is included in (T), “(R2 (17) = 5)” will occur
somewhere in (R) as a translation. Carnap rejects “R2 (17) = 5” because
it is an open sentence, but since it is contained in (R), then “ R2(R2 (17)
= 5)” can be deduced from (R), just as we can deduce “ x(Fx)” from
“ x(Fx & Gx).” The reason, I think, why he doesn’t consider this is
because he infers, from the fact that R2 is a variable, that the translation
of “Mass(17) = 5” into the ramsey-sentence “must be supplemented by
the assumptions concerning the relation R2 that are specified in the
ramsey-sentence.”10

8 Percival, Philip “Theoretical Terms: Meaning and Reference” in A Companion to the Philosophy of
Science, 503
9 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 254
10 Ibid, 254
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The argument is that R2 only has significance within (R) as a whole.
But if we are convinced by Quine’s holistic arguments, we know that
this is also the case for “Mass.” (Carnap must have found Quine
convincing – otherwise he wouldn’t have given a holistic reformulation
of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the first place).11 Without a
theory behind it, the term “mass” doesn’t have any more meaning than
“R2.” Of course “ R2(R2 (17) = 5)” will only have meaning in the
context of the whole theory, but this doesn’t mean that we can’t assert
it by itself, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to assert “Mass (17) = 5”
either; in both cases the sentence gets its meaning from the whole
theory.
Carnap’s account of theoretical terms (the (A)-postulate) was found
wanting, because of its requirement that a theory be completely
satisfied. But he had argued that we must use theoretical terms, and not
variables, because open sentences tell us nothing and closed sentences
can only be interpreted within the whole theory. This argument for the
necessity of theoretical terms fails, because a regular theory, such as (T),
is every bit as holistic as (R). If we can understand “Mass(17) = 5”
then we can understand “ R2(R2 (17) = 5).” Therefore Carnap’s
criticism of Ramsey, that the ramsey-sentence would require
enormously complex statements, is unfounded, and since we could get
along just fine with only the ramsey-sentence, Carnap’s analytic
postulate is unnecessary.
III. Causal Theory of Names and Natural Kinds
Two things were to be gathered from the last section: Carnap’s
theory of reference for theoretical terms failed, and we can get along
just fine without it, using Ramsey’s technique. But that it is possible to
get along without theoretical terms doesn’t entail that we actually do.
Scientific theories don’t seem to be either ramsey-sentences or
nonsense, and so an account of theoretical terms is still needed.
Fortunately, Carnap’s theory of theoretical terms is not the only one
available.

He says of Quine and his new formulation: “Earlier, although I did not share the pessimism of
Quine…, I always admitted that it was a serious problem and that I could not see a satisfactory
solution… Finally, after many years of searching, I found this new approach, with the new Apostulate.” An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 273-274. Carnap is not convinced by Quine’s
claim that we can’t distinguish between analytic and synthetic, but rather that any attempt to do so
must be both holistic and stipulative.

11
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Kripke proposed the causal theory of names in the following
passage from Naming and Necessity:

Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about
him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is
spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of the chain, who
has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to
Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or
from whom he ever heard of Feynman.12

When Feynman was born his parents named him and initiated a
practice of using that name to refer to their son. Thus, if I say “Kripke
told me that Richard Feynman was a physicist” I am participating in the
social practice of referring to Richard Feynman (and Kripke).
Regardless of what information I have about him, and regardless of
whether or not that information is correct (suppose Kripke was
mistaken when he said that Feynman was a physicist), I am referring to
the person for whom the social practice was initiated. Indeed, we could
only discover that what we said about a person was wrong if we actually
referred to that person.
Kripke treats natural kinds the same way. Take gold, for example.
“Suppose there were an optical illusion [due to the peculiar properties
of the atmosphere] which made the substance appear to be yellow; but,
in fact, once the peculiar properties were removed, we would see that it
is actually blue.”13 Would we say in this case that gold didn’t exist?
Kripke says no – we would say that gold is actually blue. The word
“gold” refers to that stuff, whatever it actually is, in the presence of
which we commonly say “gold.” (Think of Berkeley – he claimed that
chairs are just ideas in our heads and not material objects; he did not
say that chairs don’t exist.)
Gareth Evans developed Kripke’s brilliant insights into a fullfledged theory of reference. 14 As he sees it, the reference of a proper
name is determined like this: a person is given a name (either at birth or
later, as with a nickname) and there is a core group of people who
frequently interact with her. They call her by that name, both in and out
of her presence. Evans calls these people producers. Other people, who
have never met her, may nonetheless pick up her name by hearing
Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press 1972), 91
Ibid, 118
14 Evans, Gareth The Varieties of Reference ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford U. Press 1982).
Hilary Putnam did much the same thing, even anticipating Kripke on some points. See Putnam,
Hilary “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” in Mind, Language, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press
1975), 215-271
12
13
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somebody use it or by being given a description about her (among
other things). These people are called consumers. The essential condition
for being a consumer is that one is not able to gather and spread any
information about the person that was not already involved in the
social practice of referring to that person; to do so is to become a
producer.15 The situation with natural kinds is almost identical.16
Though just about everybody interacts with a certain species of plant,
for example, they are not all necessarily producers. The real producers
are those who can tell us what constitutes that plant, and distinguish it
from other kinds of plants; we call these people “botanists.”
It seems at first glance that this theory of names and natural kinds
works perfectly for scientific language. Consider a term like “quark.”
Most people don’t ever have anything to do (consciously) with a quark
in their entire life. Nonetheless we are all able to refer to quarks. I just
did, and the causal theory seems to provide an explanation of how it
was possible. Scientists who actually interact with quarks publish
articles about them, refer to them in class, and talk about them to their
friends. All of the people who come into contact with the word
“quark” in these ways are consumers, and they are thus able to refer to
quarks, even though they (myself included) couldn’t tell you the first
thing about a quark. If asked what I mean by “quark,” I would reply, “a
particle or something; ask a physicist.”
The causal theory does, indeed, provide a satisfactory explanation
for most cases of reference. But as I will argue in the concluding
section, closer examination of terms such as “quark” reveals an
important difference between terms for observable and unobservable
entities, a difference which necessitates two separate accounts of
reference.
IV. The Reference of Theoretical Terms
To see the distinction, imagine that I’ve been hearing scratches in
my walls and the pitter patter of little feet at night. I would infer that a
mouse is living in my apartment. 17 Think of this as a scientific theory. I
can go about testing it: I make the prediction that if I leave a piece of
cheese on the floor when I go to bed it will be gone when I wake up.
The situation here is similar to the situation with unobservable entities,
The Varieties of Reference, 376-377
Ibid, 382-383
17 The example is from Van Fraasen, Bas C. “Concerning Scientific Realism” in Philosophy of Science
ed. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 1998), 1076
15
16
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like quarks and electrons. Scientists make some observations and realize
that there are some for which we can’t account, given the present
ontology, and so they postulate a new entity. When they want to go
about testing their hypothesized entity they have to deduce, using the
theory, further consequences that it will have for observation.
Suppose that I had named the elusive mouse Frank, and that I then
proceeded to talk about him to my friends (“Frank kept me up all
night”). The causal theory would hold that I am a producer for the
practice of using “Frank” to refer to that mouse, and that the people
who hear me talking about Frank are the consumers. If one of my
friends were to say to another “I hope Greg catches Frank,” they would
be referring to the mouse in my apartment, even if they haven’t had any
contact with it.
The difference between the present example and a normal name,
like Richard Feynman, is that here we have a name that isn’t given an
ostensive baptism, but rather is fixed by description. There is no
previous object that we now call Frank; “Frank” refers to whichever
object it is that is scratching, pitter pattering, and eating my cheese.
There are many names that function like this: Jack-the-Ripper and
Deep-throat, for example.18 Whoever committed the infamous
murders, and whoever was the Watergate informant, are the people to
whom these names refer. This is exactly what is happening with an
unobservable entity in a scientific theory: the theory is not saying
“those things we call electrons have these properties,” but rather,
“there is a thing that has these properties – call it an electron.” Before
the theory comes along we have no knowledge of the properties or
even the existence of those things. All unobservable entities are
introduced this way – via description, not ostension. Otherwise they
wouldn’t be unobservable.
Every theoretical term must, at some point, have been introduced
and had its reference fixed by a theory. We can then go about using
that term to refer to the entity postulated by the theory. But the theory
itself does not refer; it sets the rules for referring. According to Kripke,
most people are given names in an initial “baptism” of sorts. When
somebody says of their newborn “we will call him Jones” they are not
referring to Jones, they refer to the boy with the word “him” and name
him Jones – fixing the name, not using it. In the introduction of an
unobservable entity, though, there is nothing to do the work that the
18 The Varieties of Reference, 47-48. For names like this Evans uses what he calls the “the quantifier,”
as in: the person such that that person committed murders x, y, and z.
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word “him” did in Jones’ baptism. When the theory of quantum
mechanics tells us about electrons it can not refer to electrons and then
say something about it. The theory tells us what electrons are and tells
us how to go about referring to them in the future – baptism by theory.
If these considerations are correct we should actually think of the
theory expressed by (T) as looking like this:
(TR) electron proton…(…electron … proton … O1 … O2 …
O3…),
which represents the implicit quantification of the name-fixing
descriptions.
Concerning observable entities theories can refer just fine. When
chemistry tells us that water is H2O, we already know what water is. In
this case the reference is not being fixed by a description. If we were to
adopt a new theory of chemistry in which water is XYZ, we could still
say that both theories were telling us the chemical composition of water,
and therefore they are referring to the same thing. Kripke argued that
even if everything we think about tigers turns out to be wrong, “tiger”
will always refer to tigers (be they animals, machines, or holograms).
This is crucial for Kripke’s conception of a name; it is his concept of
rigid designation – reference across possible worlds.19 But it isn’t clear
that the same is the case with an unobservable entity. Take away
everything we think electrons are and there is nothing left to point to
and say “we were wrong about that.”
The causal theory of names explains quite well how a lay-person
can use theoretical terms. But whereas the producers for a normal
object can perceive the object, the producers for an unobservable (the
scientists) can only detect the effects of the object, through the use of a
theory. This distinction is incredibly important, because it yields the
distinction between ostension and description. We can point to a tiger
and say “tiger,” but before a theory has fixed the reference for the term
“electron,” we can only say “that which is causing the streak in the
cloud chamber.” (“That which,” not “that.”) Of course now we can
say the word “electron,” with meaning, but only because a theory has
already determined that we should call that which causes the streak an
electron.
Without the theory of quantum mechanics scientists simply have
no interaction with electrons. (Unobservables are the noumena and the
theory is the form that we bring to experience, so to speak.) It follows
19

Naming and Necessity 48-49
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that the theory, qua ramsey-sentence, must have existed prior to the
beginning of the name-using practice. A name acquires its referent
through the behavior of a group of producers, but because the
scientists can only produce after the theory exists, the theory can not be
participating in the name using practice. Theories do not refer to
unobservable entities; unobservable entities satisfy theories, and then we
can refer to those entities. Likewise, theoretical terms for unobservable
entities refer to objects when spoken by a scientist or lay-person, but
function as implicitly quantified bound variables when occurring within
a theory.
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